Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power
研究了当群体自愿合作时，如何设计投票规则来代表异质群体，发现效率要求按利益加权，但参与约束要求对合作激励低的群体过度加权，甚至赋予否决权，为小群体最低代表权提供了理论依据。
We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain groups. In the benchmark case where groups differ only in their population size (i.e., the apportionment problem), the model provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller groups.