Public and Private Employer Learning: Evidence from the Adoption of Teacher Value Added
利用两个学区采用教师增值评价作为信息冲击，研究发现高增值教师在校内流动增加，低增值教师流向不知情学区，证实了雇主间信息不对称影响教师流动并加剧教育不平等。
Informational asymmetries between employers may inhibit optimal worker mobility. However, researchers rarely observe shocks to employers’ information. I exploit two school districts’ adoptions of value-added (VA) measures of teacher effectiveness—informational shocks to some, but not all, employers—to provide direct tests of asymmetric employer learning. I develop a learning model and test its predictions for teacher mobility. I find that adopting VA increases within-district mobility of high-VA teachers, while low-VA teachers move out of district to uninformed principals. These patterns are consistent with asymmetric employer learning. This sorting from widespread VA adoption exacerbates inequality in access to effective teaching.