Spillover Effects of Capital Expenditure Announcements Within Business Groups
研究台湾企业集团中，集团多元化和所有权结构如何影响资本支出公告在集团内部的溢出效应，发现金字塔所有权结构会削弱正向溢出，而金融危机期间溢出更强。
Abstract Using the capital expenditure announcements of Taiwanese business group affiliated firms, this study examines whether the group diversification and ownership structure influence intragroup spillover effects. We find that the stock price reactions of the announcing firms are positively associated with both the stock price reactions and the post‐announcement long‐term performance of their non‐announcing group peers. More importantly, the evidence shows that this positive spillover effect weakens for business groups associated with a pyramidal ownership structure. The evidence supports the conjecture that principal–principal conflicts play an important role in moderating the spillover effects in a business group. The findings further show that the spillover effects are stronger during periods of financial crises. Finally, in the 3‐year period following announcements, the non‐announcing group members experience declining industry‐adjusted performance.