Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
研究机制设计中委托人通过概率测试验证代理人类型的问题，刻画了测试技术可简化表示的条件，并求解了利润最大化机制，该机制随验证技术变化在无验证和完全剩余提取之间连续过渡。
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit‐maximizing mechanisms with verification. As the verification technology varies, the solution continuously interpolates between the no‐verification solution and full surplus extraction.