The Role of Career and Wage Incentives in Labor Productivity: Evidence from a Two-Stage Field Experiment in Malawi
通过马拉维的两阶段田野实验，研究了职业和工资激励如何通过自我选择和激励效应渠道影响劳动生产率，发现职业激励吸引高绩效工人但条件于选择后不提高生产率，而工资激励提高生产率。
We study how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through self-selection and incentive effect channels using a two-stage field experiment in Malawi. First, recent secondary school graduates were hired with either career or wage incentives. After employment, half of the workers with career incentives randomly received wage incentives, and half of the workers with wage incentives randomly received career incentives. Career incentives attract higher-performing workers than wage incentives do, but they do not increase productivity conditional on selection. Wage incentives increase productivity for those recruited through career incentives. Observable characteristics are limited in explaining selection effects of entry-level workers.