Rank and file equity compensation and earnings management: Evidence from stock options
研究发现普通员工股票期权薪酬增加会伴随更多盈余管理，且主要通过真实活动而非应计项目实现，这种关系在激励更强时更显著，在监督更严时减弱。
Abstract The widespread use of rank and file equity‐based compensation suggests that executives believe that rank and file employees can affect firm outcomes, and some research supports this view. If equity‐based incentives influence rank and file employees’ productive efforts, they might also influence their earnings management decisions. We find that increases in rank and file employees’ option‐based compensation—our proxy for equity‐based compensation—are associated with increases in earnings management and that this relation is attributable to real activities (as opposed to accrual) earnings management. Cross‐sectional tests indicate that the relation is stronger when rank and file option compensation is likely to generate greater performance incentives and attenuated in the presence of more intense monitoring. Finally, we explore the role of cash constraints and overvaluation as potential alternative explanations for this relation and find that neither accounts for our results.