An Information-based Theory of Financial Intermediation
该理论认为部分投资者更擅长识别交易对手的动机（筛选专家），由此形成核心-外围市场结构，核心由筛选专家主导，他们交易量最大、充当中间人、与最多对手方交易。利用微观数据和信息披露要求提供了支持证据。
Abstract We build a theory of financial intermediation based on the premise that some investors are better able to figure out the trade motives of their counterparties in bilateral meetings—screening experts. We solve for the equilibrium market structure and study how information asymmetries stemming from heterogeneity in screening expertise shape up the core–periphery trade structure. In particular, the core of the market is populated by screening experts: they have the largest share of trade volume, they are actively engaged in middleman activity, and trade with the most counterparties. Using transaction-level micro-data and information disclosure requirements, we provide extensive evidence consistent only with our theory of financial intermediation.