ACCOUNTING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMING BEHAVIOR
研究了为何社会保障福利领取集中在62岁和完全退休年龄两个时点，发现理性生命周期模型能很好解释该行为，并指出当前规则扭曲了领取和劳动供给决策，消除扭曲可带来巨大福利收益。
Abstract We study why Social Security benefit claiming is concentrated at two ages, 62 and the full retirement age, and provide three main findings. First, we show that claiming behavior can be well explained by a parsimonious life‐cycle model with fully rational agents. The two key mechanisms are (i) the strong unwillingness to hold annuities and (ii) the effects of the earnings test. Second, we show that current rules distort claiming and labor supply decisions, and eliminating these distortions results in large welfare gains. Finally, we show that claiming decisions can be used to sharpen the identification of important preference parameters.