Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP
研究了美国历史上最大银行救助计划（TARP）期间的内幕交易行为，发现政治关联银行的内幕买入与公告异常回报正相关，而无关联银行则无此关系。
Abstract We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.