Credit risk, owner liability, and bank loan maturities during the global financial crisis
研究了全球金融危机期间信用风险和所有者个人担保对银行贷款期限的影响，发现低风险、与银行关系强、提供个人担保及贷款规模大的企业获得了更长期限，而银行不良贷款多则缩短期限。
Abstract We relate credit risk and owners’ personal guarantees to bank loan maturities during the global financial crisis. The findings, which remain robust to reverse causality, show that firms rated as low risk, with a strong relationship with the bank, whose owners provided personal guarantees and with large loan sizes obtained longer maturities. Banks with larger nonperforming loans provided loans with shorter maturities. Firms with low‐ and high‐risk ratings that provided owners’ personal guarantees obtained longer maturities. These findings shed additional light on the relationship between risk and loan maturities and the role of personal guarantees in reducing information asymmetries.