Information Asymmetry and Investor Valuations of Initial Public Offerings: Two Dimensions of Organizational Reputation as Stock Market Signals
研究组织声誉的两个维度（质量知名度和普遍好感度）如何通过影响投资者关注，降低中国IPO首日抑价，帮助投资者识别企业价值。
ABSTRACT The uncertainty and information asymmetry that surround initial public offering firms (IPOs) often introduce difficulties for potential investors to discern organizational value, thereby leading to ‘underpricing’. Using the signaling theory, we investigate the role of organizational reputation in the underpricing of IPOs. We analyze 463 initial public offerings in China from the period of 2010 to 2016 and find that being known for quality and generalized favorability dimensions of reputation are negatively related with underpricing on the first day of trading. In addition, we find that the negative effects of organizational reputation on underpricing are mediated by investor attention.