A Policy Framework for the Bank of Amsterdam, 1736–1791
研究了阿姆斯特丹银行如何通过近乎零利率的无限回购大额硬币来供应成功的法定货币，发现宽松贷款导致贷款水平波动，银行通过公开市场操作进行冲销以稳定货币价值，但追求铸币税最终损害了稳定。
This article describes and measures how the Bank of Amsterdam supplied a successful fiat money in a world of specie by offering the unlimited repo of large coins at a near-zero rate. Our data from 1736 to 1791 finds that such liberal access led to volatile loan levels and that the Bank responded with sterilization by means of open market operations. In this way, the Bank held its money stock at a roughly constant level and helped stabilize its value. Profit was another part of the Bank’s policy framework, and the pursuit of seigniorage eventually compromised stabilization.