The Political Influence of Voters’ Interests on SEC Enforcement
研究美国证券交易委员会（SEC）的执法是否受选民就业利益的政治影响，发现大雇主在政治重要州或高失业选区更少被执法，尤其在总统选举或国会监督委员会成员选举期间。
ABSTRACT I examine whether political influence as a response to voters’ interest in employment levels is reflected in the enforcement actions of the SEC. I find that large employers are less likely to experience SEC enforcement actions. Next, I examine whether variations in politicians’ sensitivity to employment levels result in variations in enforcement against large employers. I find that large employers are less likely to face enforcement actions during presidential elections if they are based in politically important states. Large employers also face fewer enforcement actions if they are based in high‐unemployment states during elections of senators who serve on SEC oversight committees. Large employers based in high‐unemployment districts enjoy lower enforcement if their members of Congress serve on SEC oversight committees. The findings suggest that voters’ interests are reflected in SEC enforcement.