Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection
通过陈述选择实验，研究信息摩擦和逆向选择对长期护理保险市场均衡的影响，发现信息摩擦普遍存在且导致巨大福利损失，而逆向选择作用很小。
This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses, while selection plays little role.