Does market power discipline CEO power? An agency perspective
研究了产品市场竞争如何影响CEO权力，发现竞争越激烈CEO权力越小，且这种约束在治理薄弱、CEO持股低、分析师覆盖少或业绩运气好的公司中更明显，表明市场力量可替代公司治理约束CEO权力。
Abstract We examine how product market competition (PMC) shapes chief executive officer's (CEO) power. Using various measures to capture both PMC and CEO power, our analyses, which include a quasi‐natural experiment, find evidence that CEOs have less power when the product market is more competitive. Furthermore, the impact of PMC on CEO power is more pronounced for firms with entrenched management, lower CEO ownership, lower analyst coverage, and for firms experiencing good ‘luck’ (windfall performance). Our results suggest that market power can act as a substitute for corporate governance in disciplining CEO power, particularly when prone to agency problems.