Justifying optimal play via consistency
为两人零和博弈中的最优玩法（maximin策略）提供规范性基础，通过后果主义、一致性和理性假设三个公理，证明理性且一致的后果主义者必须采用maximin策略，并可将结果扩展至双矩阵博弈中的纳什均衡。
Developing normative foundations for optimal play in two‐player zero‐sum games has turned out to be surprisingly difficult, despite the powerful strategic implications of the minimax theorem. We characterize maximin strategies by postulating coherent behavior in varying games. The first axiom, called consequentialism , states that how probability is distributed among completely indistinguishable actions is irrelevant. The second axiom, consistency , demands that strategies that are optimal in two different games should still be optimal when there is uncertainty regarding which of the two games will actually be played. Finally, we impose a very mild rationality assumption, which merely requires that strictly dominated actions will not be played. Our characterization shows that a rational and consistent consequentialist who ascribes the same properties to his opponent has to play maximin strategies. This result can be extended to characterize Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games whenever the set of equilibria is interchangeable.