Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
研究了在蜈蚣博弈中，代理人通过固定次数测试各策略并选择总收益最高的策略的群体博弈动态，发现单次测试导致合作集中在最后几个节点，多次测试则产生循环行为。
We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game. Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play.