The Robinson–Patman Act and Vertical Relationships
利用酸奶产品的批发和零售价格数据及纵向谈判模型，检验罗宾逊-帕特曼法案是否真正约束了制造商与零售商之间的谈判，发现该法案并未有效约束，而严格执法虽能改善社会福利却无法保护弱势零售商。
Bargaining between consumer‐product manufacturers and their retail customers is at least nominally constrained by the prohibitions on price discrimination of the Robinson–Patman Act (RPA) of 1936. However, because the RPA is generally regarded as being inconsistent with the anti‐trust principle of protecting consumers, it is not often enforced by the Federal Trade Commission or the Anti‐trust Division of the Department of Justice. Because of the perceived ineffectiveness of the RPA, it is unclear whether manufacturers follow the letter of the law, or actively bargain with their downstream customers. In this paper, we use data on wholesale and retail prices for yogurt products, and a Nash‐in‐Nash vertical bargaining model, to test whether the RPA represents a real constraint on bargaining between manufacturers and retailers. We find that this is not the case, and that vertical markets for consumer goods are more accurately characterized as bargaining‐markets than markets regulated by the RPA. Further, we demonstrate that strict enforcement of the RPA would improve social welfare, but would not protect weak retailers.