REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
研究在禁止合同间交叉补贴的监管下，知情消费者可同时与多家保险公司交易的市场均衡，发现该均衡无法被社会计划者帕累托改进，因此公共干预应针对定价策略而非限制消费者选择。
Abstract This article studies an insurance market on which privately informed consumers can simultaneously trade with several firms operating under a regulation that prohibits cross‐subsidies between contracts. The regulated game supports a single equilibrium allocation in which each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This competitive allocation cannot be Pareto‐improved by a social planner who observes neither consumers' types nor their trades with firms. Public intervention under multiple contracting and adverse selection should thus arguably target firms' pricing strategies, leaving consumers free to choose their preferred amount of coverage.