Powerful CEOs, cash bonus contracts and firm performance
研究了强势CEO如何影响其现金奖金合同条件，发现强势CEO获得更高的预期奖金比例和更多非财务绩效目标，其中量化和企业社会责任相关的非财务目标能提升后续公司绩效，而未定义的非财务目标则损害绩效。
Abstract We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power and the proportion of ex‐ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association between CEO power and the relative use of non‐financial to financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non‐financial targets in cash bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex‐ante bonus ratios and higher proportions of non‐financial performance targets compared to less powerful CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and corporate social responsibility (CSR)‐related non‐financial performance targets is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non‐financial performance targets is negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. These results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and variable definitions.