Leader Selection and Service Delivery in Community Groups: Experimental Evidence from Uganda
通过随机分配乌干达储蓄贷款小组的领导者选举方式（公开讨论或私下投票），发现私下投票选出的领导者在社会经济特征上更不具优势，但小组对贫困成员更包容且经济效率未降低。
In developing countries, NGOs and governments often rely on local groups for the delivery of financial and public services. This paper studies how the design of rules used for group leader selection affects leader identity and shapes service delivery. To do so, we randomly assign newly formed savings and loan groups to select their leaders using either a public discussion procedure or a private vote procedure. Leaders selected with a private vote are found to be less positively selected on socioeconomic characteristics. This results in groups that are more inclusive toward poor members, without being less economically efficient.