There Is No Free House: Ethnic Patronage in a Kenyan Slum
利用肯尼亚基贝拉贫民窟的数据，研究发现当房东与地方酋长同属一个族群时，租户支付更高租金且住房质量更差；而当租户与酋长同族时，租金更低、投资更多。识别策略依赖酋长的外生任命，并经过断点回归等检验。
Using unique data from one of Africa's largest informal settlements, the Kibera slum in Nairobi, we provide evidence of ethnic patronage in the determination of rental prices and investments. Slum residents pay higher rents and live in lower quality housing (measured via satellite pictures) when the landlord and the locality chief belong to the same ethnicity. Conversely, rental prices are lower, and investments higher when residents and chiefs are co-ethnics. Our identification relies on the exogenous appointment of chiefs and is supported by several tests, including a regression discontinuity design.