Transparency and Talent Allocation in Money Management
构建并分析了委托投资管理模型，研究基金经理通过基金透明度传递投资技能信号，不同技能水平的经理在透明与不透明基金中的策略差异，并给出可检验的预测。
Abstract We construct and analyze the equilibrium of a model of delegated portfolio management in which money managers signal their investment skills via fund transparency. To lower the costs of transparency, high-skill managers rely on their performance to separate from low-skill managers over time. In contrast, medium-skill managers rely on transparency to separate, especially when it is difficult for investors to tell them apart through performance alone. Low-skill managers mimic high-skill managers in opaque funds, hoping to replicate their performance and compensation. The model yields several novel empirical predictions that contrast transparent and opaque funds. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.