Competition and Strategic Incentives in the Market for Credit Ratings: Empirics of the Financial Crisis of 2007
研究了2007-2008年金融危机前后商业抵押贷款支持证券市场中评级机构扭曲评级以迎合发行方的激励，发现危机后均衡扭曲程度下降，并基于政策进行了反事实实验。
We study the market for ratings agencies in the commercial mortgage backed securities sector leading up to and including the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Using a structural model adapted from the auctions literature, we characterize the incentives of ratings agencies to distort ratings in favor of issuers. We find an important equilibrium distortion, which decreased after the crisis. We study several counterfactual experiments motivated by recent policymaking in this industry.