The Impact of Investor Horizon on Say‐on‐Pay Voting
研究发现短期投资者更倾向对高管薪酬方案投弃权票，仅在CEO薪酬过高时才投反对票；长期投资者通常投赞成票，原因是有效监督而非与管理层合谋。这解释了薪酬投票异议率低的现象。
Shareholder investment horizons have a significant impact on say‐on‐pay voting patterns. Short‐term investors are more likely to avoid expressing opinion on executive pay proposals by casting an abstaining vote. They vote against board proposals on pay only in cases where the CEO already receives excessive pay levels. In contrast, long‐term investors typically cast favourable votes. According to our findings, this is due to effective monitoring rather than collusion with the management. Overall, investor heterogeneity in terms of investment horizons helps explain say‐on‐pay voting, in particular the low levels of say‐on‐pay dissent, which have recently raised questions over the efficiency of this corporate governance mechanism .