Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search
构建了一个新的均衡搜索模型，消费者最初搜索折扣，但随着截止日期临近愿意支付更高价格，最终转向全价卖家。模型解释了折扣与全价卖家共存的现象，并应用于在线零售拍卖和标价销售，发现截止日期导致的动态搜索摩擦会使看似中性的平台费用增加引发市场大幅变化。
We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase reveal consumers' reservation prices. We find robust evidence supporting the theory. We quantify dynamic search frictions arising from deadlines and show how, with deadline-constrained buyers, seemingly neutral platform fee increases can cause large market shifts.