Crowdfunding, Financing Constraints, and Real Effects
研究了预售众筹合同的可行性与最优设计，分析了融资约束如何影响垄断者的生产决策，并揭示了资本成本、需求不确定性与生产之间的新互动。
We study the feasibility and optimal design of presale crowdfunding contracts where participating consumers pay a premium above the future expected spot price and financially constrained entrepreneurs balance the potential product–market distortions introduced through presale crowdfunding against the cost of traditional external financing. Our analysis shows how such crowdfunding contracts enable the execution of projects that could not be otherwise undertaken and highlights novel interactions between the cost of capital, demand uncertainty, and production. Tighter financing constraints reduce the ability of the monopolist to extract surplus but, contrary to the usual result, may increase production. We evaluate how uncertainty and market size reduce the price-discriminating power of the monopolist and affect the optimal contract regime. Nevertheless, we show how such presale price-discriminating contracts are implementable even when the number of potential consumers is relatively high and their individual demand is stochastic. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.