Selling Failed Banks
研究发现美国FDIC出售破产银行时平均损失达资产的28%，破产银行多被同县、业务相似且资本充足的银行收购，否则被远距离的银行收购；资本不足导致支付意愿与能力脱节，造成资源错配并部分解释FDIC的损失。
ABSTRACT The average FDIC loss from selling a failed bank is 28% of assets. We document that failed banks are predominantly sold to bidders within the same county, with similar assets business lines, when these bidders are well capitalized. Otherwise, they are acquired by less similar banks located further away. We interpret these facts within a model of auctions with budget constraints, in which poor capitalization of some potential acquirers drives a wedge between their willingness and ability to pay for failed banks. We document that this wedge drives misallocation, and partially explains the FDIC losses from failed bank sales.