Searching for Service
研究在存在搜寻摩擦的市场中，服务是否会被提供。发现当服务成本不太高时，市场可能提供服务，但会导致服务过度提供，且服务提供者与非服务提供者可以共存。
Since Telser (1960), there is a well-established argument that a competitive market will not provide service due to freeriding. We show that with search frictions, the market may well provide service if the cost of doing so is not too large. Any market equilibrium with service provision has two or more firms providing service, implying overprovision of service as the social optimum mandates at most one service provider. Firms that provide service and those that do not can coexist, where consumers direct their search to service providers first to obtain service, and to nonservice providers later to enjoy lower prices.