Optimal contracts for renewable electricity
研究了从两个风险厌恶且不可靠的可再生能源发电商采购给定电量的最优合同，对比集中与分散投资，发现随着可再生能源成本下降，合同将更依赖超额订购而非提高可靠性。
Companies are increasingly choosing to procure their power from renewable energy sources, with their own set of potential challenges. This paper characterizes the contracts that minimize the cost of procuring a given amount of renewable energy from two risk averse, energy generators who are inherently unreliable (such as wind and solar). We contrast outcomes arising when investments are set in centralized and decentralized settings, with the absence of reliability addressed by either issuing orders in excess of what is needed or by investing in improved reliability. Our results suggest that future contracts may be geared towards a greater reliance on order inflation and lower investments in reliability as the cost of renewable energy keeps falling. The implications of these results for grid congestion and electricity spot market prices should be of interest to regulators and transmission system operators.