Does stardom affect the informativeness of a CEO's insider trades?
研究CEO的明星地位是否影响其内部交易的信息含量，发现非明星CEO的交易能预测未来异常收益和盈利创新，而明星CEO的交易则不能。
Abstract This study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non‐star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non‐star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades. We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non‐star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non‐star CEOs compared with star CEOs.