Performance peer groups in CEO compensation contracts
研究了企业如何选择CEO相对业绩评价合同中的对标公司，发现企业倾向于选择业绩较弱的对标公司，且加强信息披露并未改变这一倾向。
Abstract How do firms choose performance peer groups used in chief executive officer (CEO) relative performance evaluation contracts? We find that while firms, for the most part, choose performance peers to better identify their CEOs’ impact on firm performance, they also tend to select underperforming peers. Dynamically, we find that peers that are added and retained every year are weaker than ones that were not chosen. These findings suggest managers may have some influence on the choice of performance peers. Finally, using a quasi‐natural experiment, we find that enhanced disclosure did not affect the tendency of firms to select underperforming peers.