AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF COOPERATION IN THE DYNAMIC COMMON POOL GAME
通过实验研究动态公共池游戏中参与者能否合作，发现即使合作激励很大，多数人仍采用不依赖历史信息的马尔可夫策略，且这种策略的流行度随合作激励增加而下降。
Abstract This article studies experimentally to what extent subjects can cooperate in a dynamic common pool game, where the stage game changes endogenously. Although efficiency can be supported with strategies that condition on history, the main finding is that it is difficult to cooperate. Even if the incentives to cooperate are large, modal behavior can be rationalized with equilibrium Markov strategies that do not condition on history. The popularity of Markov strategies, however, is decreasing in the incentives to cooperate. The evidence also suggests that strategic uncertainty added by facing stage games that change in time may move play away from efficiency.