Estimating an Equilibrium Model of Horizontal Competition in Education
构建并估计了一个学校间横向竞争的均衡模型，利用巴基斯坦数据量化了学生与学校匹配质量的重要性，发现私立学校追求利润的行为加剧了不平等并降低了福利和学习效果。
The quality of the match between students and schools affects learning, but little is known about the magnitude of these effects or how they respond to changes in market structure. I develop a quantitative equilibrium model of school competition with horizontal competition in match quality. I estimate the model using data from Pakistan, a country with high private enrollment, and (1) quantify the importance of good matches, (2) show that profit-maximizing private schools' choices of quality advantage wealthier students, increasing inequality and reducing welfare and learning, and (3) provide intuition for when interventions in the market are valuable.