Dynamic Incentives and Permit Market Equilibrium in Cap-and-Trade Regulation
构建并估计了一个包含排放削减、投资和许可证交易的动态结构模型，应用于美国酸雨计划，发现许可证银行可缓解交易成本导致的效率损失，而排放税政策可在无交易成本时接近动态总量控制与交易的效果。
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of emissions abatement, investment, and permit trading with banking under cap-and-trade regulation. The model accounts for forward-looking behavior and transaction costs in the permit market, which determine the temporal and geographical distribution of emissions in equilibrium and, thus, the welfare implications of the regulation. The model is applied to the US Acid Rain Program to evaluate the role of regulatory designs. Permit banking mitigates inefficiencies arising from transaction costs and modifies the timing of emissions. An emissions tax policy could achieve an outcome close to dynamic cap and trade without transaction costs.