When Does the Board Blame the CEO for Poor Firm Performance? Extreme Resource Reallocation and the Board's Industry and CEO Experience
研究发现，当公司业绩不佳时，极端资源重新配置会增加CEO被解雇的可能性，而董事会的行业和CEO经验会强化这一关系。
Abstract This study sheds light on our understanding of when boards dismiss the CEO by considering the inherent conflict created by the board's advisory role when the firm underperforms. Using a sample of US firms listed in Standard & Poor's ExecuComp for the period 2000–2012 we find that, when a firm underperforms, extreme resource reallocation increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal. This relationship is positively moderated by the board's industry and CEO experience. The study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by identifying the conditions that trigger dismissal of the CEO in light of boards’ motive to protect their reputation.