Debunking Rumors in Networks
研究社交网络中真假消息的传播，发现真相若持续存在，谣言也会持续；沟通强度不影响谣言相对流行度，而同质性效应取决于验证过程；有效政策应增加个人验证动机。
We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Communication intensity in itself is irrelevant for relative rumor prevalence, and the effect of homophily depends on the exact verification process and equilibrium verification rates. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals’ incentives to verify.