Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
研究了当社会中至少有一个遵循“非必要不说谎”原则的部分诚实个体时，哪些社会选择规则可以通过纳什均衡实施，并给出了完整刻画。
Abstract A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”, to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of $$ n\ge 3$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>n</mml:mi> <mml:mo>≥</mml:mo> <mml:mn>3</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> individuals, a social choice rule that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the (unanimous) social choice rules that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. When all individuals are partially-honest, then any (unanimous) rule is partially-honestly Nash implementable. An account of the welfare implications of partially-honest Nash implementation is provided in a variety of environments.