Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment
研究了信号博弈实验中类型分配方式（每期独立随机分配 vs. 一次性固定分配）对参与者行为的影响，发现固定类型时更多发送者选择“退出”，符合自我确认均衡的预测。
We study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment but not when types are i.i.d. Our results confirm that more senders do play Out in the fixed-type treatment.