Managerial incentives for attracting attention
研究管理者为何有动力通过股票拆分公告、盈利预测和新闻稿等方式吸引市场关注，发现绩效薪酬会激励这种行为，分析师随后会增加覆盖，而若股价未涨则CEO会受罚。
Abstract This paper studies the mechanisms which motivate managers to engage in cheap talk and attract the market's attention in a credible way. We consider stock split announcements, voluntary earnings forecasts, and press releases issued by firms to the media as proxies for managerial cheap talk. We show that: (a) managerial performance‐related pay contracts incentivize executives to attract attention; (b) analysts increase their coverage of firms following cheap talk; and (c) chief executive officers are punished for attracting attention when market prices do not increase following cheap talk. The results are stronger for firms which are most in need of attention.