A POSITIVE THEORY OF GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE*
构建了一个动态一般均衡模型，解释跨国数据中地理流动性、失业和劳动力市场制度的差异。模型显示，居住时间越长的人越偏好高失业保险，这种自我强化机制可能导致“欧洲”和“美国”两种稳态。
This article presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model explaining cross‐country data on geographical mobility, unemployment, and labor market institutions. Rational forward‐looking agents vote on unemployment insurance (UI). Agents with higher moving costs (larger attachment to their location) prefer more generous UI. Attachment is assumed to increase with the duration of residence. UI mitigates incentives for moving and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. This self‐reinforcing mechanism can yield two steady‐states: one “European” and one “American.” The former (latter) features high (low) unemployment, low (high) geographical mobility, and high (low) UI.