The Value of Central Clearing
研究了1882年法国勒阿弗尔咖啡期货市场首个中央对手方清算所如何通过解决缺失市场和逆向选择问题，改变欧洲贸易流向并促进新交易者进入，对金融衍生品市场设计有参考价值。
ABSTRACT I study a contracting innovation that suddenly insulated traders of hedging contracts against counterparty risk: central clearing counterparties (CCPs) for derivatives. The first CCP was created in Le Havre (France) in 1882, in the coffee futures market. Using triple difference‐in‐differences estimation, I show that central clearing changed the geography of trade flows Europe‐wide, to the benefit of Le Havre. Inspecting the mechanism using trader‐level data, I find that the CCP solved both a “missing market” problem and adverse selection issues. Central clearing also facilitated entry of new traders in the market. The successful contracting innovation quickly spread to other exchanges.