Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
通过新颖实验设计，在完美监控的无限重复囚徒困境中直接获取被试策略，发现多数人采用“总是背叛”“以牙还牙”和“冷酷”三种简单策略，并检验了基于回合合作数据的统计恢复方法的有效性。
We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects’ strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies repre‑ sent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit‑for‑Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round‑by‑round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions.