Should I Stay or Should I Grow? Using Voluntary Disclosure to Elicit Market Feedback
研究管理者如何通过自愿披露资本支出预测来获取市场反馈，发现管理者会根据股票市场对预测的反应调整实际资本支出，且这种调整与未来业绩正相关。
Abstract We explore the use of voluntary disclosure by managers to solicit market feedback. Using managerial capital expenditure forecasts, we find that managers adjust annual capital expenditures upward (downward) in response to positive (negative) stock market reactions to capital expenditure forecasts, but only for those forecast announcements that stimulate rather than discourage informed trading. These capex adjustments motivated by market feedback correlate with higher future performance and are stronger (weaker) when outsiders (managers) are more informed. Finally, we show that managers are more likely to issue and learn from capex forecasts when predisclosure stock prices are affected by transitory nonfundamental shocks.