Information, Market Power and Price Volatility
研究了有限数量代理人拥有私人信息时的需求函数竞争，发现信息结构接近完全信息时，市场势力可在零到垄断之间任意变化，而价格波动始终低于总冲击的方差。
Abstract We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. Regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade). By contrast, price volatility is always lower than the variance of the aggregate shock across all information structures. Alternative trading mechanisms lead to very distinct bounds as a comparison with Cournot competition establishes.