Enforcing social norms: Trust‐building and community enforcement
研究了匿名交易中无合同情况下如何维持诚实行为，通过重复随机匹配博弈，发现社区执行和信任建立可以普遍维持合作，信任建立阶段一个社区克制短期欺骗动机，另一社区不惩罚偏离，随后进入合作阶段。
We study impersonal exchange and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's dilemma. We show that cooperation can be sustained quite generally, using community enforcement and “trust‐building.” The latter refers to an initial phase in which one community builds trust by not deviating despite a short‐run incentive to cheat; the other community reciprocates trust by not punishing deviations during this phase. Trust‐building is followed by cooperative play, sustained through community enforcement.