The Effect of War Risk on Managerial and Investor Behavior: Evidence from the Brussels Stock Exchange in the Pre-1914 Era
利用两种基于新闻的战争风险度量，研究发现管理者通过削减股息来应对战争风险，投资者对战争新闻反应负面，且战争爆发后外国公司更可能退市。
With two news-based measures on war, I document that managers mitigated war risk through dividend cuts, arguably to establish a war chest. Moreover, I find that companies postponed their initial public offerings and that foreign companies were more likely to delist after the onset of wars. Investors reacted negatively to the increase in war news coverage. There is evidence of mean-reversion after a threat of war and a negative drift following the start of war. Finally, I highlight the importance of proximity to military conflicts. In general, the evidence indicates that both managers and investors became more risk averse as a consequence of war news.