Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships
首次实证分析普通合伙人薪酬时机与私募股权基金绩效的关系，发现按项目支付薪酬的合同与更高回报相关，并探讨了退出时机激励与投资者保护之间的权衡。
We offer the first empirical analysis connecting the timing of general partner (GP) compensation to private equity fund performance. Using detailed information on limited partnership agreements between private equity limited and general partners, we find that “GP-friendly” contracts—agreements that pay general partners on a deal-by-deal basis instead of withholding carried interest until a benchmark return has been earned—are associated with higher returns, both gross and net of fees. This is robust to measures of performance persistence, time period effects, and other contract terms and is related to exit-timing incentives. Timing practices balance GP incentives against limited partner downside protection. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.