Why do stock repurchases change over time?
研究了股票回购行为的时间变化，发现2002年萨班斯-奥克斯利法案通过后，管理者更可能通过回购操纵盈余，尤其是那些刚好错过分析师预测的公司。
Abstract Recent studies have shown the time trends of firm stock repurchase behavior. We examine these time changes for stock repurchase through the lens of real activities earnings management. Managers appear more likely to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Furthermore, suspect firms that just missed analyst earnings per share forecasts have higher incentives to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases. The results are not driven by changes in corporate governance associated with the passage of SOX. Overall, our results suggest earnings management can be a significant determinant of the dynamics of stock repurchases.