择校中的统一入学

Common enrollment in school choice

Theoretical Economics · 2019
被引 27
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

研究了美国学区统一入学系统中学校参与模式对学生偏好的影响,发现全面参与最有利但难以实现,并提出了实现全面参与的方案。

Abstract

Increasingly, more school districts across the United States are using centralized admissions for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first show that across all school‐participation patterns, full participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to the most preferred outcome for students. Second, we show that, in general, participation by all schools may not be achievable because schools have incentives to stay out. This may explain why some districts have not managed to attain full participation. We also consider some specific settings where full participation can be achieved and propose two schemes that can be used by policymakers to achieve full participation in general settings.

学校选择统一录取系统学校参与激励机制设计